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# JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SPECIAL HISTORICAL STUDY

## HISTORY OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

1946 - 1977



HISTORICAL DIVISION  
JOINT SECRETARIAT  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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Historical Division  
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## HISTORY OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

### Origins in World War II

(U) Unified command over US operational forces was adopted during World War II. It was a natural concomitant of the system of combined (US-British) command set up during that conflict by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Unified command called for a single commander, responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by a joint staff, and exercising command over all the units of his assigned force, regardless of Service. The system was generally applied during World War II in the conduct of individual operations and within geographic theater commands.

(U) Even before the war ended, the Joint Chiefs of Staff envisioned retention of the unified command system in peacetime. They agreed that when General Eisenhower's combined headquarters (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force) was dissolved, he would then become the commander of all US forces in Europe. A directive appointing General Eisenhower as Commanding General, US Forces, European Theater (CG USFET) was issued by the JCS on 28 June 1945, soon after V-E Day.

(U) In the Pacific, attempts to establish a unified command for the entire area proved impossible. Service interests precluded the subordination of either of the two major commanders in that area (General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz). During the final campaigns in the Pacific, therefore, these two officers held separate commands, as Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific (CINCAFPAC) and Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC), respectively.

### The First Unified Command Plan, 14 December 1946

(U) The impetus for the establishment of a postwar system of unified command over US military forces worldwide stemmed from the Navy's dissatisfaction with this divided command in the Pacific. On 1 February 1946 the CNO characterized the existing arrangement, with Army and Navy forces under separate command, as "ambiguous" and "unsatisfactory." He favored establishing a single command over the entire Pacific Theater (excluding Japan, Korea, and China), whose commander would have a joint staff and would exercise "unity of command" over all US forces in the theater.

(U) This CNO proposal was discussed at some length. It was opposed by representatives of the Army and Army Air Forces, who favored unity of command on a basis of assignment of mission and forces, rather than of area of responsibility. The Navy's plan, they feared, would deprive General MacArthur of control of ground and air forces that he might need for his mission.<sup>1</sup>

(U) After considerable discussion, a compromise emerged as part of a comprehensive worldwide system of unified command for US forces under JCS control. The resulting "Outline Command Plan," which was in effect the first Unified Command Plan (UCP), was approved by President Truman on 14 December 1946. It called for the eventual establishment, as an "interim measure for the immediate postwar period," of seven unified commands. These commands, their areas of responsibility, and their missions were as follows:

(1) Far East Command: US forces in Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, the Marianas, and the Bonins. Its commander, CINCFE, would carry out occupation duties; maintain the security of his command; plan and prepare for a general emergency in his area; support CINCPAC; and command US forces in China in emergency.

(2) Pacific Command: forces allocated by the JCS within the Pacific area. CINCPAC would defend the US against attack through the Pacific; conduct operations in the Pacific; and maintain security of US island positions and sea and air communications; support US military commitments in China; plan and prepare for general emergency; and support CINCFE and CINCAL.

(3) Alaskan Command: US forces in Alaska, including the Aleutians. CINCAL would protect Alaska, including sea and air communications, and protect the United States from attack through Alaska and Arctic regions. He would plan and prepare for general emergency and support CINCFE, CINCPAC, and CG SAC.

(4) Northeast Command: US forces assigned to Newfoundland, Labrador, and Greenland. CINCNE would maintain the security of his area and defend the United States against attack through the Arctic regions within his command; protect sea and air communications in his area; control Arctic airways as appropriate; support CINCEUR, CINCLANTFLT and SAC; and plan and prepare for a general emergency.

(5) Atlantic Fleet: comprising forces assigned to the Atlantic Fleet, US Navy. CINCLANTFLT would defend the United

States against attack through the Atlantic; plan and prepare for general emergency; and support US forces in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Northeast, and the Caribbean.

(6) Caribbean Command: US forces in Panama and the Antilles. CINCARIB would defend the United States against attack through his area; defend sea and air communications (with CNO coordinating between CINCARIB and CINCLANTFLT); secure the Panama Canal and US bases in Panama and the Caribbean; plan and prepare for general emergency; and support CINCLANTFLT.

(7) European Command: all forces allocated to the European Theater by the JCS or other authority. CINCEUR would occupy Germany, support the national policy in Europe "within the scope of his command responsibility" and plan and prepare for general emergency.

(U) The general principles established by the UCP were as follows:

Unified command in each command will be established in accordance, in so far as practicable, with Chapter 2, paragraph 12, of Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, [with] component forces consisting of Army, Army Air, and Naval forces. Forces assigned to a command will normally consist of two or more components and each will be commanded directly by an officer of that component. Each commander will have a joint staff with appropriate members from the various components of the Services under his command in key positions of responsibility. Commanders of component forces will communicate directly with appropriate headquarters on matters such as administration, training, and supply, expenditure of appropriated funds, and authorization of construction, which are not a responsibility of unified command. The assignment of forces and the significant changes therein will be as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(U) The JCS would exercise strategic direction over all elements of the armed forces. They would assign forces to the unified commands and prescribe the missions and tasks of those commands. The Services would retain operational control of all forces not specifically assigned by the JCS. Each unified command would operate under a designated Service Chief acting as executive agent for the JCS: the Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; or the Commanding General, Army Air Forces (later Chief of Staff, US Air Force).

(U) By a separate provision of the UCP, the JCS recognized the existence of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), a command of the Army Air Forces (later USAF) which was not normally based overseas. It was made up of strategic air forces of the Army Air Forces not otherwise assigned. The commander of SAC was responsible to the JCS, but no specific mission was assigned to him by the JCS at that time. SAC became the first example of what was later designated a specified command, though the term did not come into use until 1951.<sup>2</sup>

#### Establishment of CINCFE, CINCPAC, CINCAL, CINCEUR

(U) Approval of the UCP did not in itself establish the commands named in the plan; a separate implementing directive was required for each command. The first three to be created were the Far East Command (FECOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Alaskan Command (ALCOM). A JCS directive of 16 December 1946 established these commands effective 1 January 1947. The executive agents for these commands were the CSA, CNO, and CG, AAF (later CSAF), respectively.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The next to be established was the European Command (EUCOM), established by directive of 24 February 1947, effective 15 March 1947, with CSA as executive agent. In effect, CINCEUR was simply a new title for CG USFET. Since the latter had earlier been given direct command over US ground forces in Europe, no intermediate Army component headquarters was necessary.<sup>4</sup>

#### Establishment of CINCLANT

(U) For the Atlantic, the original UCP would have set up a purely Naval command under JCS direction (CINCLANTFLT). On 5 August 1947 the CNO recommended instead that CINCLANTFLT be established as a fully unified commander, under the broader title of Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT), and with his mission being "to conduct operations in the Atlantic," instead of the narrower phraseology used in the UCP, "to control the sea and secure the airways through the Atlantic." Also, the relations between the Atlantic and Caribbean Commands required clarification, in the CNO view. Finally, CNO recommended that the JCS assume direction of US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NAVEASTLANTMED, formerly US Naval Forces Europe, or USNAVEUR).<sup>5</sup>

(U) The Army and Army Air Force members on the JCS considered it "neither necessary nor desirable" to broaden the status and mission of CINCLANTFLT as CNO desired or to give CINCLANTFLT command over



ground and air forces. The JCS postponed action on this matter while they dealt with less controversial aspects of unified command. Effective 1 November 1947, CINCARIB and CINCLANTFLT were activated, and CINCNAVEASTLANTMED (shortened in May 1948 to CINCNELM) was placed under JCS direction. The CSA became executive agent for CINCARIB and CNO for the other two. CINCARIB assumed command of all US forces in the Caribbean Islands and the Panama area except for certain fleet units and facilities that were placed under operational control of CINCLANTFLT.<sup>6</sup>

(U) A few days later, CNO renewed his suggestion for the establishment of a unified Atlantic Command. This time his colleagues withdrew their objections, and on 1 December 1947 the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) was created under the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT).<sup>7</sup>

(U) Thus by the end of 1947, action had been taken on all of the seven commands envisioned in the original UCP except the Northeast Command (CINCNE). This presented political difficulties involving the Canadian Government, as described below. Meanwhile the National Security Act of 1947 had been passed by Congress and signed by the President; it gave the JCS a legal basis for existence and affirmed their responsibility for establishing unified commands in "strategic areas," "subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense."<sup>8</sup>

#### Developments in 1948

(U) As a result of continuing controversies over the roles and missions of the Services, the Secretary of Defense met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Key West, Florida, in March 1948 and worked out a detailed statement of the functions of each Service and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This "Key West Agreement," approved by the President and the Secretary of Defense and formally issued on 21 April 1948, recognized the JCS responsibility for unified commands and allowed them to authorize unified commanders "to establish such subordinate unified commands as may be necessary." It also sanctioned the practice, already well-established, of designating a JCS member as executive agent for each command.<sup>9</sup>

(U) Several months later, mounting tensions in Europe led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enlarge CINCEUR's mission somewhat. On 30 June 1948 they directed CINCEUR (1) to supervise and coordinate all plans and actions of US forces under his command (and such other forces as might be made available in a general emergency), and (2) to maintain reserve forces that could be employed elsewhere in an emergency.<sup>10</sup>

(U) Neither CINCEUR nor other unified commanders had been assigned logistic or administrative responsibilities under the original UCP. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized a need to grant them such responsibilities, and did so in an amendment to the UCP on 7 September 1948. Commanders of unified commands were made responsible "for coordination of logistic and administrative support of the component forces of their unified command," subject to legislative limitations, departmental regulations, and budgetary considerations.<sup>11</sup>

(U) In another change in the UCP on 29 September 1948, the JCS assigned to CINCNELM responsibility for joint planning at the theater level for implementation within his area of joint plans directed by them. "This planning," they stated, "will be accomplished for all three U. S. Military Services, and will include plans for the employment of such other forces as may be available for meeting a general emergency. CINCNELM's planning for employment of the Strategic Air Forces will be confined to logistic planning in support of such operations."<sup>12</sup>

#### Status of SAC

(U) The status of SAC as a command under JCS direction was clarified by two directives issued by the JCS in 1949. On 4 January they designated the CSAF their executive agent for SAC. On 13 April the missions of CG, SAC (or CINCSAC, as he was later called) were set forth. He was charged with command over all forces allocated to him by the JCS or other authority and was assigned definite missions, including the conduct of strategic air operations or such other air operations as the JCS directed and with the support of other commanders under the JCS. He was also charged with planning for his assigned missions.<sup>13</sup>

#### Establishment of Northeast Command

(U) The question of activating the Northeast Command, to cover the approach route for enemy attack across Greenland, Labrador, and Newfoundland, was addressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1948. At that time, the CNO expressed opposition to the establishment of a unified command in that area. There were, in his view, too few US forces there to justify a unified command; moreover its location in foreign territory would provide excellent propaganda for the communists and would generate misunderstanding and friction with Canada and the United Kingdom. CNO favored instead an Air Force command in the area, under JCS operational

control exercised through CSAF (in effect, a specified command). The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force rejoined that the JCS would be "derelict if they did not provide a command structure for the efficient, integrated control of . . . forces" in the area in question. Thereupon the CNO evidently withdrew his objection. In April 1949 the JCS approved the establishment of the Northeast Command and sought approval from the Secretary of Defense to issue a directive for the command. Recognizing the political sensitivity of the issue, they cautioned the Secretary against publicity and urged that the action be coordinated through the US/Canadian Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD). This recommendation was adopted; the Secretary of Defense instructed the US section of the PJBD to inform their Canadian colleagues that the United States intended to establish the command.<sup>14</sup>

(U) The Canadian Government asked that the new command be titled "US Forces, Northeast." As a compromise, the JCS suggested "US Northeast Command," which Canada accepted. By a JCS decision on 29 August 1950, approved by the Secretary of Defense on 8 September, the US Northeast Command was established effective 1 October 1950, with CSAF as executive agent.<sup>15</sup>

#### Command Changes in the European Theater, 1949-1952

(U) Important political developments occurring in Europe in 1949 were reflected in altered command arrangements. On 23 May 1949 the JCS removed US Forces in Austria from assignment to EUCOM, setting up these forces as an independent command responsible directly to the JCS. Several weeks later, when the President appointed a civilian High Commissioner for Germany, CINCEUR was relieved of his responsibilities as Military Governor of Germany. Changes in his mission effected by the JCS spelled out his relationship with the High Commissioner.<sup>16</sup>

(U) The year 1949 also saw the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the ensuing months, NATO moved to shore up the defenses of Western Europe against a possible attack from the east. These developments showed a need for a stronger US air command in Europe. The JCS approved establishment of the Commander in Chief, US Air Forces in Europe (CINCUSAFE) on 20 November 1950, at the same level as CINCEUR and CINCNELM. Since those two commands were in effect Army and Navy commands, the result was three separate Service commands for the European area. CSAF was named the JCS executive agent for CINCUSAFE. Missions of CINCLANT, CINCEUR and CINCNELM were modified as necessitated by creation of the new command.<sup>17</sup>

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(U) In 1951 the position of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) was established, to be held by a US officer. SACEUR was given "operational command, to the extent necessary for the establishment of your mission," of all US forces in Europe, regardless of Service: that is US [Army] Forces, Europe; US Air Forces, Europe; and US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

(U) The precise relationship between SACEUR and US commands remained to be spelled out in detail. On 7 July 1952 the President approved recommendations by the JCS that effected fundamental changes in unified command in Europe. Those changes vested requisite command authority in one individual. With Presidential concurrence the JCS established a full-fledged unified command in Europe under the title US European Command (USEUCOM) under a Commander in Chief, US European Command (USCINCEUR) who was also SACEUR. USCINCEUR exercised unified command and authority (except to the extent that operational control was exercised by NATO commanders) over all US forces allocated him by the JCS or other competent authority. He was granted covert limited authority to operate in Berlin, Austria, Trieste and Yugoslavia when so directed by the JCS. USCINCEUR was instructed to establish a US Headquarters with a Deputy and joint US staff at the earliest practicable date. He was encouraged to delegate extensive authority to his Deputy. The existing "JCS commands" in Europe--EUCOM, NELM and USAFE--were designated component commands under the new US European Command, although unilateral Service functions would still be handled through single Service channels. EUCOM was to be given a new title and would continue as a JCS specified command for missions with respect to Berlin. Both NELM and USAFE would continue as specified commands for currently assigned missions outside USCINCEUR's area of responsibility. The CSA was designated executive agent for USEUCOM, also for the old European Command, now redesignated US Army Forces Europe (USAREUR). CNO was named executive agent for NELM and CSAF for USAFE.<sup>18</sup>

(Z) USCINCEUR assumed command in Europe effective 1 August 1952. In a message approved by the Secretary of Defense, the JCS on 2 December 1952 spelled out for USCINCEUR his geographical area of responsibility: Norway, Denmark, Western Germany, Berlin, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Austria, Trieste, the Mediterranean Sea, the Mediterranean Islands (exclusive of the Balearics), Algerian Departments of France, and the United Kingdom, including the territorial waters of those countries. His only authority for the rest of continental Europe was in the field of covert military planning. His North African responsibilities were limited to joint planning in French Morocco, Tunisia and Libya and to military aspects of negotiations for base rights. The

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Secretary of Defense delegated some of his responsibilities concerning the Mutual Security Program (MSP) in Europe to USCINCEUR on 15 July 1952. He directed that USCINCEUR administer the military aspects of the MSP, including the control and administration of military units engaged in military assistance. USCINCEUR would also coordinate US military matters that were of joint logistical or administrative nature, including military assistance activities, US military procurement, base rights negotiations and base construction.<sup>19</sup>

#### Clarifying Responsibilities of Unified Commanders, 1950

(U) Following a review of missions and deployments of US forces, the JCS approved several changes to the basic UCP on 16 February 1950. They removed South Korea from CINCFE's area of responsibility but added the Volcano Islands, while also divesting CINCFE of some responsibilities for China. CINCEUR was relieved of his requirement to maintain reserve forces, and CINCAL and CINCPAC were charged with coordinating Arctic airways. Finally, the statement that the UCP was an "interim measure" was deleted.<sup>20</sup>

(U) The status of forces under one unified commander operating within the general area assigned to another commander was the subject of a JCS directive of 27 April 1950. The JCS did not intend to limit unified commanders rigidly to fixed geographic boundaries, but wished rather to leave them free to operate where necessary to carry out their assigned missions. Commanders were authorized to extend operations into areas normally under cognizance of another commander if necessary for the accomplishment of assigned tasks. In routine operational matters, commanders under the JCS were enjoined to coordinate closely with each other. Forces sent to reinforce a unified commander (or other commander operating under JCS direction) would be assigned to that commander's operational control.<sup>21</sup>

(U) Adjustments in areas of responsibilities affecting CINCARIB, CINCLANT and, to a lesser extent, CINCPAC, were ordered by the JCS in the early 1950's. In changes to the UCP suggested by the CNO and approved by the JCS on 18 July 1950, CINCLANT was given the missions of protecting Caribbean sea communications, to include ASW operations and the control, routing, and protection of shipping. Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier (COMCARIBSEAFRON) would perform these missions for CINCLANT. Additionally, CINCLANT was charged with furnishing CINCARIB with sea lift in an emergency. CINCARIB's mission was modified accordingly. He was also directed to

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
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coordinate with British, Venezuelan, and Dutch authorities in protecting oil fields in Venezuela, Trinidad, and Curacao. These changes brought questions from both CINCLANT and CINCARIB, which called forth clarifications on 21 August 1950. The JCS made CINCLANT responsible for protection of the Pacific Ocean approaches to the Panama Canal, and made it clear that COMCARIBSEAFRON was directly responsible to CINCLANT for protection of sea communications in the Caribbean and the Pacific approaches. (In early 1951, protection of the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal was reassigned from CINCLANT to CINCPAC.)<sup>22</sup>

#### Command in the Far East During the Korean War

(U) The outbreak of the Korean War and subsequent developments in the Far East put US unified command there to a test which it passed readily. Although General MacArthur, as CINCFE, had been relieved of responsibility for South Korea, early US reactions to the North Korean attack on 25 June 1950 were taken through his command, which was conveniently located for the purpose. These initial reactions, including logistic support to the ROK, protection of evacuation, air operations and, eventually, ground operations, were taken with Presidential approval outside the authority of unified command under the UCP. On 10 July, at the request of the United Nations, President Truman directed General MacArthur to establish the United Nations Command (UNC) for purposes of operations against the North Korean invaders. From that point General MacArthur, as CINCFE, supported the operations of the UNC which he commanded as CINCUNC. His primary responsibility as CINCFE remained the defense of Japan, however. Over the strong objections of CINCFE, the JCS transferred the Marianas-Bonin and Volcano Islands from his responsibility and placed them under CINCPAC. The President concurred in this action on 9 April 1951. Further transfers of responsibility from CINCFE were approved by the JCS in late 1951, when they made CINCPAC responsible for US security interests in the Philippines, the Pescadores, and Formosa.<sup>23</sup>

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(U) In the Far East Command as organized under General MacArthur, there were component commanders for the Air Force and Navy: Commanding General, Far East Air Forces (CG FEAF) and Commander Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE). General MacArthur himself, however, retained direct command of Army components, wearing a second hat as Commanding General, Army Forces Far East (CG AFFE). His staff was essentially an Army staff, except for a Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) which had Air Force and Navy representation. In 1952, after General MacArthur had left FECOM, the headquarters of Army Forces Far East was fully staffed and placed on a par with the other two component commands, and the Far East Command was given a truly joint staff.<sup>25</sup>

#### Interim Revision of the UCP, 1952-1953

(U) The establishment of USEUCOM in July 1952, with attendant changes in the command structure in Europe, as described earlier, pointed to a need for a new UCP. A draft revision submitted by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense on 24 December 1952 incorporated these changes, and extended USCINCEUR's responsibilities to include planning for military operations in Spain and Yugoslavia. At the same time, the revision proposed to centralize ASW responsibilities under CINCLANT and CINCPAC in their respective areas, ending the existing situation whereby ASW responsibility in the Atlantic was divided among CINCLANT, CINCNELM, and CINCNE.<sup>26</sup>

(S) The revised plan also listed those responsibilities given USCINCEUR for coordinating logistical and administrative matters, such as military assistance and base rights negotiation. Because the CSA was listed as the executive agent for USCINCEUR, the plan could be read as broadening the responsibilities of executive agents beyond the sphere of strategic direction and operational control of forces. This aspect of the plan attracted unfavorable attention from the new Administration that took office in January 1953, just after the JCS plan was completed. The new Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, at once began a review of DOD organization and functions, focusing particularly on the role of executive agents. On 13 February Secretary Wilson instructed the JCS to rewrite the plan to stipulate that USCINCEUR's logistic and administrative responsibilities were exercised on the authority of the Secretary of Defense. Thus revised, the plan was

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approved by the Secretary on 30 June 1953 purely for use in the preparation of emergency plans, and without prejudice to later modifications. The JCS promulgated the plan, with this limitation, on 24 July 1953.<sup>27</sup>

#### Reorganization of the DOD, 1953: Change in the Executive Agent System

(U) The Eisenhower Administration's review of DOD organization stemmed from a promise made by General Eisenhower during his successful campaign in 1952. The result was a reorganization plan sent to Congress in April 1953. This plan had several objectives, one of which was to strengthen civilian control of the military forces. With this end in view, the President directed that authority to appoint executive agents for unified and specified commands be transferred from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, who would name the Secretary of a Military Department to act in this capacity for each command (although the Secretaries would be authorized to delegate this responsibility to the military Chiefs of their Services). This change, according to the President, would strengthen civilian control by fixing responsibility along a definite channel of accountable civilian officials. It would also allow the JCS to concentrate on strategic planning and policy advice by freeing them from operational responsibilities.<sup>28</sup>

(U) The transfer of authority to name executive agents was accomplished by revising the Key West Agreement on 21 April 1948. The Secretary of Defense approved the revision on 1 October 1953 and circulated it on 16 March 1954. On 15 January 1954, he designated the following executive agencies for the unified and specified commands: The Department of the Army for the Far East Command, Caribbean Command, and US European Command; the Department of the Navy for the Atlantic Command, Pacific Command, and US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean; and the Department of the Air Force for the Alaskan Command, US Northeast Command, US Air Forces, Europe, and Strategic Air Command.<sup>29</sup>

#### Establishment of an Air Force Component for CINCPAC

(U) At the beginning of 1954 the US Air Force component commander for CINCPAC also held the position of senior US Air Force officer of the Pacific Division, Military Air Transport Service. Since this officer had no staff as component commander, he could not adequately assist CINCPAC in performing his assigned missions.



The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 April 1954, in connection with CINCPAC's planning for the defense of Taiwan, directed the CSAF to establish an Air Force component of Pacific Command, with a designated component commander and appropriate staff. To avoid duplication, the component commander was to act as a subordinate commander of CG FEAFF on matters pertaining solely to the US Air Force. On 5 June 1954 the CSAF announced that the Pacific Air Force would be established effective 1 July 1954 as the Air Force component command under CINCPAC, with headquarters in Hawaii.<sup>30</sup>

#### Establishment of the Continental Air Defense Command

(U) By 1954, the increasing threat of Soviet atomic air attack on the Continental United States led the JCS to establish a command, including forces of all three Services, to defend against this new danger. In arriving at this decision, the JCS were responding, in part, to conclusions reached by the Eisenhower Administration on the need to improve continental air defenses, including command arrangements.

(U) The actual form of the new organization, arrived at after lengthy discussion, was a "joint," rather than a "unified" or "specified" command. This terminology was adopted to allow issuance of terms of reference that might not fit exactly the definitions of these two forms of command organization.<sup>31</sup>

(U) The JCS informed the Secretary of Defense of their intention to form the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) on 25 July 1954; he indicated his approval on 30 July and, in accordance, with a JCS recommendation, named the Secretary of the Air Force as his executive agent for the new command.<sup>32</sup>

(U) The JCS issued terms of reference for CONAD, establishing its activation date as 1 September 1954 and designating Headquarters US Air Force Air Defense Command, augmented by representatives of the other Services, to be the Headquarters, Continental Air Defense Command at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado. The Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD), was also designated Commander, US Air Force Air Defense Command, a component command.

(U) The new command was to consist initially of the US Air Force Air Defense Command, the US Army Antiaircraft Command, and a Naval command composed of the forces of the contiguous Naval radar coverage system. Forces of the seaward extensions of the early

warning system (as distinct from contiguous forces) were to continue under CINCLANT and CINCPAC, and the early warning installations in Alaska and US Northeast Command were to continue under CINCAL and CINCNE.<sup>33</sup>

#### The 1955 UCP

(U) Earlier, Secretary Wilson had directed the JCS to make recommendations to him with respect to the unified command system areas and executive agent responsibilities. In studying these matters the JCS came to the conclusion that because of unsettled world conditions, no major revisions in the command structure should be made at that time. They agreed instead to bring the limited interim UCP of 24 July 1953 into line with the revised Key West Agreement and the establishment of CONAD. After considerable review and personal consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the JCS submitted a revised UCP for his approval on 18 February 1955. The only substantive changes from the earlier version involved those necessitated by the creation of CONAD and the establishment of an early warning system. On 2 March 1955, the Secretary of Defense approved this revision of the UCP and directed the JCS to keep the unified command structure under continuing review, reporting to him on the subject at least once each year. The plan was distributed on 9 March 1955.<sup>34</sup>

#### Changes in Terms of Reference for CONAD

(U) After two years' experience with the command arrangements they had established for CONAD on 1 September 1954, the JCS concluded that the "double hatted" arrangement by which CINCONAD was also commander of the Air Force Component (Air Defense Command) was not desirable. They accordingly informed the Secretary of Defense on 5 June 1956 that CINCONAD should not serve as the commander of the Air Defense Command but should establish a separate and distinct headquarters (including a joint staff) for CONAD and exercise operational control over all components and assigned forces. However, the JCS could not agree on the meaning of "operational control." The CJCS, supported by the CMC, CSAF, and CNO, wanted a clear and unequivocal delegation of authority to CINCONAD to centralize control of all operations down to the assignment of targets to individual antiaircraft batteries. The CSA, who was particularly concerned that Army antiaircraft unit commanders would lose the right to engage targets of opportunity, insisted that CINCONAD share

responsibility for operational control with his component commanders through a requirement to "coordinate" with them. However the JCS were all in agreement that CINCONAD's responsibilities should be strengthened by assigning him specific responsibility to submit estimates of force and weapons requirements to the JCS. The Secretary of Defense resolved the split in favor of the JCS majority; the new terms of reference were issued to CINCONAD on 4 September 1956.<sup>35</sup>

#### Reorganization in 1956: Abolition of CINCFE

(U) The first of the annual reviews of the UCP directed by the Secretary of Defense was carried out by the JCS in 1956. On 4 June of that year they submitted a revised UCP in which they proposed some important changes. The responsibilities of CONAD would be enlarged to include air defense of Alaska and the Northeast. The US Northeast Command would be abolished. The Alaskan Command would continue but with sharply reduced responsibility, since it would also lose the mission of protecting sea communications in Alaskan waters, which would be assumed by CINCPAC. In Europe, USAFE would be abolished as a specified command, but would continue as the Air Force component of USEUCOM. A Middle East Command (MECOM) would be established some time in the future, at which time the Navy specified command, CINCNELM, would be abolished. (CINCNELM had already been relieved of responsibility for preparing plans for the Middle East, which had been assigned to an OJCS committee, the Joint Middle East Planning Committee.) CINCARIB's status would be considerably altered. His responsibility for defending the US against attack through the Caribbean and for security of bases and possessions in that sea would be transferred to CINCLANT. On the other hand, CINCARIB would become responsible for representing US interests and administering the Mutual Defense Assistance Program in Central and South America (less Mexico); he would also continue to administer the MDAP in the Caribbean Islands. The plan also provided that, unless specifically authorized, no unified commander was to exercise direct command of any of the Service components or of a subordinate force; this would mean that CINCPAC would no longer exercise direct command of the Pacific Fleet, as he had been doing.

(U) The future of the Far East Command was the subject of a disagreement, which the JCS referred to the Secretary of Defense for decision. Four of the members recommended that CINCFE be abolished and his functions turned over to CINCPAC. They believed that the divided command in the Western Pacific-Far East area should be abolished, particularly in view of the dwindling US military strength

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in Japan and Korea, which cast doubt on the advisability of a separate command for that region. The lone dissenter was the CSA, who argued that an attempt to split up CINCFE's multiple functions--as a US commander, as commander of the UNC in Korea, and as military governor of the Ryukyu Islands--would produce inefficiency and higher costs. He wanted the Far East Command to be expanded, with CINCFE given responsibility for Southeast Asia, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines, places where the CSA perceived a growing communist threat. Especially he wanted CINCFE to assume the supervision of military assistance in those regions.<sup>36</sup>


(C) The Secretary of Defense approved the proposed new UCP on 21 June 1956. In so doing, he approved the disestablishment of CINCFE effective 1 July 1957. His decisions were subsequently approved by the President, and the revised plan was distributed on 3 July 1956. USAFE had already, by a JCS directive, been abolished as a specified command on 1 July. The US Northeast Command was disestablished effective 1 September 1956.<sup>37</sup>

(U) An outline plan for disestablishing CINCFE and redistributing his responsibilities was approved by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense and took effect on 1 July 1957. A subordinate unified command under CINCPAC was established in Japan: Commander, US Forces (COMUS) Japan. The senior US Army officer in Korea was designated Commander, US Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA), directly subordinate to the Commanding General, US Army, Pacific (CG USARPAC); he was also named CINCUNC. CG, USARPAC became governor of the Ryukyu Islands.<sup>38</sup>

(U) CINCPAC, whose responsibilities were enlarged upon the disappearance of FECOM, gave up direct command of the Pacific Fleet, in accord with the UCP of 3 July 1956. He delegated this command to the Deputy CINCPAC. Later (13 January 1958), with the approval of higher authority, the Deputy position was abolished and replaced by CINCPACFLT as the naval component command of PACOM.<sup>39</sup>

(C) The disestablishment of FECOM was reflected in a revised UCP drawn up by the JCS in 1957, following their annual review of the unified command system. During this review, at the direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, they examined the advisability of retaining ALCOM. They concluded that, despite ALCOM's reduced responsibilities, its strategic location and its responsibilities for ground defense of the Alaska area justified its retention.<sup>40</sup>

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Reorganization of the Department of Defense in 1958

(U) By 1958, President Eisenhower had become convinced that rapidly developing military technology, as dramatized by SPUTNIK, demanded a more unified and streamlined chain of command to deploy combat forces. The days of separate land, sea and air warfare were over, the President believed; therefore complete unification of all military planning and combat forces and commands was essential. To this end, the President proposed and the Congress enacted the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, amending the National Security Act of 1947.

(U) The new law authorized the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice of the JCS, to establish unified and specified commands, to assign missions to them, and to determine their force structure. This provision did not alter procedure or confer any new authorities, since under the 1947 law, the JCS had taken these actions subject to the "authority and direction" of the President. The intent of the new law was to establish a clear line of command from the President through the Secretary, with the JCS as the Secretary's operational staff. The commanders of unified and specified commands were made responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense for carrying out assigned missions and were delegated full "operational command" over forces assigned to them. Forces, once assigned, could only be transferred with Presidential approval. However, responsibility for administration of these forces remained with the respective Military Departments.42

(U) By separate executive action, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, discontinued the designation of military departments as executive agents for unified and specified commands.

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Henceforth, the chain of command would run from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the unified and specified commanders. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were assigned to serve as the Secretary's staff in performing this function. Orders issued by them to the commands would be in the name of, and under the authority of, the Secretary of Defense.<sup>43</sup>

(d) Necessary revisions of the UCP to bring it into conformity with the Defense Reorganization Act were approved by the President and issued by the Secretary of Defense, based on JCS recommendations, on 4 September 1958. They were issued to the Commanders on 8 September. This revised plan redesignated CONAD a unified rather than a joint, command. It also authorized component commanders to communicate directly with their Service Chiefs on administration, personnel, training, doctrine, logistics, communications, and other matters of uniservice interest.<sup>44</sup>

(e) The Secretary of Defense, again on JCS advice, took an additional step to implement the Reorganization Act on 2 February 1959 when he approved a definition for "operational command," as delegated by the Act to commanders of unified and specified commands. It contained the following elements: to direct the composition of subordinate forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, control overall assigned resources, and exercise full authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command would be exercised through Service component commanders or commanders of subordinate commands, if established. This definition, amended to state specifically that operational command did not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training, was included in the 1963 revision of the UCP.<sup>45</sup> (See below, p. 23.)

#### The Revised UCP of 1961

(f) A revised UCP was approved by the President on 30 December 1960 and issued to commanders on 4 February 1961. It introduced only one significant substantive change in existing authorities of unified and specified commanders: deletion of the authority for a commander, in times of dire emergency, to assert operational command of forces scheduled for, or actually engaged in, operations under war plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This deletion was made on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who feared the consequences to the orderly conduct of operations that might result from a diversion of forces by a unified or specified commander. Of particular concern was any diversion of SAC

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forces engaged in assigned general war missions, where centralized control over timing, penetration, and weight of effort were essential to a successful effort. Of lesser concern were the possible adverse effects of diversions of naval and ground forces transiting a unified command area en route to accomplish assigned missions in other areas. In addition provisions of CINCONAD's terms of reference were incorporated in the UCP and the terms of reference rescinded.<sup>46</sup>

#### Refining Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Responsibilities

(Ø) Political developments in the Middle East, Africa, and the Caribbean during the 1960s presented new challenges to the United States and called for adjustments in the military command structure. The first of these changes concerned the Middle East. Pending activation of a Middle East Command, CINCNELM was acting as specified commander responsible for the conduct of operations in countries east of Libya and south of Turkey, and in the Arabian and Red Seas and the Bay of Bengal. In 1959, however, reconsideration of this temporary arrangement became necessary because the Department of State opposed creation of a military command in the Middle East. When queried by the JCS, USCINCEUR and CINCNELM each insisted that he was best qualified to assume Middle East planning responsibilities. The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff agreed with USCINCEUR, on grounds (a) that assignment of these functions to CINCNELM might violate the 1958 Reorganization Act's concept of unity of command and (b) that it was "an anomaly" for CINCNELM, a subordinate of USCINCEUR, to exercise operational control over the forces of his superior. In fact, they favored disestablishment of CINCNELM as a specified command. But the CNO and the CMC maintained that experiences in Suez and Lebanon demonstrated the necessity for retaining a specified commander (i.e., CINCNELM) unencumbered by NATO responsibilities.<sup>47</sup>

(Ø) Concurrently, two additional problems arose. First, the CNO proposed that CINCNELM's title, in his capacity as naval component commander to USCINCEUR, should be changed to USCINNAVEUR--an appellation more descriptive of his responsibilities in USEUCOM. Second, the CSAF complained about CINCNELM's practice of identifying himself as CINCSPCOMME (CINC, Specified Command, Middle East), saying that the JCS had neither recognized nor authorized that title. The CNO, in rebuttal, defended the use of the title as "a very practical and customary means of facilitating the performance of CINCNELM's Middle East mission."<sup>48</sup>

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(c) In February 1960, the Secretary of Defense settled these questions on the basis of an "interim solution" suggested by the JCS Chairman. First, CINCNELM was renamed CINCUSNAVEUR when acting in his component capacity. Second, CINCNELM was confirmed as a specified commander and authorized to carry out contingency and general war planning.

Third, CINCNELM would cease using the title CINCSPCOMME. If he conducted operations in the Middle East, he would do so as CINCNELM.<sup>49</sup>

(b) (1)  
(6) (5)

#### CINCLANT Assumes African Tasks

(c) Communist penetration of the chaos-ridden Congo created another set of new command problems. In November 1960, the Secretary of Defense gave CINCLANT the responsibility for plans and operations pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa; he also instructed CINCLANT to establish a small Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF-4) under an Army lieutenant general. Several months later, in response to a JCS request, Secretary McNamara changed the UCP's wording so that CINCLANT no longer bore responsibility for "routine" matters in sub-Saharan Africa but was, instead, responsible for contingency planning and for commanding any JCS-directed operations.<sup>50</sup>

(c) A controversy arose over whether CINCLANT was now excluded from "routine" sub-Saharan operations. The CNO and the CMC recommended that he assume responsibilities similar to those assigned to all other unified commanders. The CSA and CSAF asked that the matter be deferred to allow further study. In July 1961, Secretary McNamara apportioned sub-Saharan responsibilities as follows: MAP to USCINCEUR and the Secretary of the Army; Congo air evacuation to USCINCEUR; and the Congo sea evacuation to CINCLANT.<sup>51</sup>

#### Command Changes for Cuban Operations

(c) The emergence of a Communist regime in Cuba added to CINCLANT's burdens. In April 1961, CINCLANT asked the JCS to activate Army and Air Force components (CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT) already authorized under general provisions of the UCP. He cited, as justification, increased planning requirements for Cuba and the Congo. In July, the CNO and the CMC recommended to their colleagues that CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT be activated. The CSA and CSAF replied that Tactical Air Command (TAC) and Continental Army Command (CONARC) were already giving CINCLANT sufficient planning support. Secretary McNamara's decision was as follows. First, CINCLANT should be provided with an adequate staff; the JCS Chairman would decide how many Army and Air Force officers should be so assigned, and whether their billets would be permanent.

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Additionally, COMTAC and CG, CONARC were told to designate interim Army and Air Force component commanders who would assist in Cuban contingency planning; they chose CG, XVIII Airborne Corps and Commander, 19th Air Force. The Secretary did not authorize any further steps at that time because (1) CINCLANT possessed no significant Air Force and Army units and (2) JTF-4 supplied adequate support for sub-Saharan planning.<sup>52</sup>

(c) The Cuban missile crisis tested CINCLANT's supporting organization. On 20 October 1962, when the quarantine was being prepared, CINCLANT designated COMTAC and CG, CONARC as interim Air Force and Army component commanders for contingency planning. (In September, on his own initiative, COMTAC had assumed the duties of CINCAFLANT). Also, CINCLANT changed the invasion plan by naming CG, CONARC, rather than CG, XVIII Airborne Corps, as Commander, Joint Task Force--Cuba. CINCLANT intended to exercise "operational command" of Service Task Forces through the component commanders. On 21 October, the JCS transferred from CINCSTRIKE (see next section) to CINCLANT temporary operational control of all Army and Air Force units involved in Cuban operations. Next day, CINCLANT promulgated a new command structure. CG, XVIII Airborne Corps was redesignated CJTF-Cuba; he would report directly to CINCLANT. Thus CG, CONARC was effectively excluded from the operational chain of command.<sup>53</sup>

(U) The CNO believed that the Cuban missile crisis clearly demonstrated CINCLANT's need for full-time Army and Air Force component commanders, which every other unified commander possessed. Accordingly, in December 1962, he recommended to the JCS that COMTAC and CG, CONARC be so designated. No action was taken at the time, however. It was not until December 1966 that COMTAC and CG, CONARC were designated component commanders for CINCLANT.<sup>54</sup>

(U) During the 1965 Dominican intervention, CINCLANT again exercised operational control over Service Task Force commanders. A Navy Vice Admiral supervised evacuation of US citizens and Marine landings; an Army Lieutenant General became US Commander, Dominican Republic.<sup>55</sup>

#### Establishment of Strike Command

(U) In 1961, general purpose forces available in CONUS for fast overseas deployment consisted of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC, containing the combat-ready units in Continental Army Command), the composite air strike forces of Tactical Air Command (TAC), and Navy and Marine Corps units not assigned to unified commands. In

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March 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara ordered the JCS to develop a plan for integrating STRAC and TAC into a unified command.<sup>56</sup>

(C) The JCS Chairman, the CSA, and the CSAF endorsed this idea, provided that the new command eventually included Navy and Marine Corps units. But the CNO objected that the inherent flexibility of naval forces would be sacrificed if assigned to a command tailored to STRAC and TAC. He suggested instead that troop-carrier and ground-support aircraft be made organic to the Army or that a joint task force be organized that would train air-ground teams for augmentation of existing commands. Similarly, the CMC argued that development of a "doctrine" for joint Army-Air Force operations would suffice.<sup>57</sup>

(U) Secretary McNamara ruled in favor of the proposed new command. United States Strike Command (USSTRICOM) was activated on 1 January 1962 under an Army general. USSTRICOM assumed operational control over the combat-ready forces of TAC and CONARC. Its missions were to: provide a general reserve for reinforcement of other unified commands; train assigned forces; develop joint doctrine; and plan for and execute contingency operations if ordered by the JCS. It had no regional responsibilities.<sup>58</sup>

(C) In the drafting of an amendment to the UCP incorporating the new command, a further JCS split occurred. The CNO and the CMC wished to include a statement that USSTRICOM would comprise only Army and Air Force units. Their colleagues considered such a statement unnecessary and, indeed, incompatible with the basic considerations appropriately included in the UCP. Secretary McNamara approved their view, and an amendment formally incorporating USSTRICOM into the UCP, omitting the restrictive limitation on forces, was promulgated in October 1962.<sup>59</sup>

#### Altered Arrangements for the Middle East and Africa

(U) In December 1962, a US military commitment in the Congo seemed possible. Consequently, the Chairman requested a review of planning and operational responsibilities in sub-Saharan Africa. Under current arrangements, CINCLANT carried the responsibility for planning and conducting operations in this area. JTF-4 acted as his executive agent; if necessary, it would also serve as the nucleus of a theater headquarters. Related responsibilities were USCINCEUR, for North Africa and for "cold war" and MAP matters in the Middle East; CINCNELM, for planning and operations in the Middle East.<sup>60</sup>

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(C) A long inter-Service controversy, which had to be settled by Secretary McNamara, ensued. The Chairman, supported by the CSA and CSAF wanted CINCSTRIKE to be made responsible for planning and force employment in the Middle East, sub-Sahara Africa, and Southern Asia (MEAFSA). They justified this solution from the standpoint of speed and flexibility. Currently, they contended, "LANTCOM and NELM are required to execute operations with forces they do not have, using force employment plans developed by other commands, while USSTRICOM, with the organization and resources, is restricted to non-combatant functions and responsibilities." But the CMC feared that this extension of CINCSTRIKE's responsibilities would lead to creation of a "world-wide General Purpose Forces Command," which he opposed. He therefore advocated assigning all Middle East and Sub-Sahara responsibilities to CINCNELM. The CNO saw no need for major changes; CINCNELM was thoroughly familiar with Middle Eastern problems, and the likelihood of a major military confrontation in Africa struck him as remote.<sup>61</sup>

(C) Secretary McNamara decided that CINCSTRIKE's responsibilities should expand to include MEAFSA. Since the Department of State voiced concern about African reaction to the title "CINCSTRIKE," he assigned to the commander the concurrent title of "CINCMEAFSA." On 30 November 1963, CINCSTRIKE became responsible for planning and operations in the Middle East, sub-Sahara Africa, and Southern Asia.

MEAFSA included the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf; CINCLANT's area encompassed the western Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Bay of Bengal. COMTAC and CG, CONARC became CINCMEAFSA's Air Force and Army component commanders; in 1966, CINCLANT became his naval component. On 1 December 1963, NELM and JTF-4 were disestablished. USCINCEUR no longer faced the paradoxical situation of his naval component commander also being a specified commander responsible to the JCS. Further, the shearing of USCINCEUR's MAP and "Cold War" duties in the Middle East reduced USEUCOM to NATO-Europe and North Africa west of Egypt, making it more accurately a European command.<sup>62</sup>

(C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted to the Secretary of Defense the necessary changes in the UCP to reflect these decisions. He directed that they be incorporated, along with all other recent changes (see pages 18, 24) in complete revision of the Plan. This revision was submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 15 October 1963 and was subsequently approved by the President, with effective date of 1 December 1963.<sup>63</sup>

(U) Nonetheless, these new arrangements ran afoul of practical difficulties. In 1964, when hostages in the Congo had to be rescued, USCINCEUR rather than CINCMEAFSA coordinated the operation because

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
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USEUCOM provided the transports that carried the Belgian paratroopers. For the same reason, during the 1967 Middle East war, USEUCOM arranged the evacuation of Americans from Jordan as well as Libya.<sup>64</sup>

CARIBCOM Redesignated USSOUTHCOM

(d) On 17 August 1962, the JCS recommended that the Caribbean Command be redesignated US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), a title that would more nearly reflect the actual geographical responsibilities of the Command (Central America), less Mexico, and South America and thereby facilitate the relations of CINCARIB with Latin American governments. In addition, the new title would emphasize the interest of the United States in promoting the "Alliance for Progress," and in encouraging Latin American countries to tighten internal security against communist subversion. The Secretary of Defense, while not objecting to the change in title, withheld his approval until 1 May 1963 because of Congressional criticism of the Latin American Military Assistance Program. The change in title was announced on 11 June 1963 and was incorporated in the revised UCP of 1 December 1963.<sup>65</sup>

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(c) The Secretary of Defense approved this command arrangement in principle on 29 July; appropriate changes were made in the UCP revision that went into effect on 1 December 1963.<sup>67</sup>

Command Relations in the Vietnam War

(C) Command over US forces engaged in the war in Vietnam was exercised by CINCPAC, in whose command area the scene of operations lay, and by CINCSAC, who retained command of SAC forces employed in the war. CINCPAC's command authority was delegated to three subordinates: COMUSMACV, a subordinate unified commander; CINCPACAF, commander of the PACOM Air Force component; and CINCPACFLT, commander of the PACOM Navy component.

(C) COMUSMACV, the first of the PACOM subordinate commanders to assume Vietnam responsibilities, was appointed on 8 February 1962 to take control of an expanding US program of advice to South Vietnamese military forces and of operations by US military forces (largely air transport) being introduced to support South Vietnamese combat operations. When President Kennedy directed the establishment of a new US command in Vietnam, the Secretary of Defense called for the creation of a new unified command reporting to him through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCPAC objected to this arrangement on the grounds that communist pressures throughout Southeast Asia dictated a unified military effort for the area as a whole. They proposed that this could best be accomplished by a subordinate unified command under CINCPAC. This was the solution adopted.<sup>68</sup>

(C) As the war intensified and US forces entered combat in increasing numbers, USMACV acquired air and naval component commands. The Commanding General, 2d Air Division became the commander of the air component in 1964 and Deputy COMUSMACV for Air in 1965. In 1966, the 2d Air Division became the 7th Air Force. The air component commander controlled the operations within South Vietnam of all units comprising the 2d Air Division (or 7th Air Force). At first, the Chief of Naval Advisory Group served as Naval Component Commander. When Marine units landed in South Vietnam in 1965, their commander assumed the responsibility of naval component commander for COMUSMACV, a post he held until 1966. At that time, problems inherent in the formation of navy units for inshore patrol the previous year led to the appointment of a Navy flag officer to the post of Commander, US Naval Forces Vietnam. He was responsible, under COMUSMACV, for coastal patrols and operations on South Vietnamese inland waters.<sup>69</sup>

(U) Introduction of substantial US Army ground forces in Vietnam also required establishment of arrangements to assure the necessary command and control over them. After lengthy debate among authorities in Washington, South Vietnam and Pearl Harbor, the decision was made not to create an Army component command under COMUSMACV,

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but to continue COMUSMACV in a "double-hatted" role as overall commander and commander of Army forces.<sup>70</sup>

(c) COMUSMACV thus commanded all US forces and operations within South Vietnam and certain naval coastal patrol activities in contiguous waters extending out about 30-40 miles. There was one exception to his command authority, however. Air strikes and naval gunfire support on targets in South-Vietnam were provided by the 7th Fleet, operating under control of CINCPACFLT.<sup>71</sup>

(c) Decisions to expand the war beyond the boundaries of South Vietnam and adjacent coastal waters gave rise to new command relationships. In general, command of these operations was exercised by CINCPAC's air and naval component commanders. Responsibility for conducting air attacks on North Vietnam, designated ROLLING THUNDER, was delegated by CINCPAC to CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT, who directed operations by the 2d Air Division (later 7th Air Force) and 7th Fleet respectively. COMUSMACV participated in ROLLING THUNDER by exercising an informal operational control over the Vietnamese Air Force, thereby avoiding the necessity for creating a combined command structure. The CG, 2d Air Division (7th Air Force) coordinated the efforts of all forces engaged in ROLLING THUNDER. Naval surface operations in North Vietnamese waters were the responsibility of CINCPACFLT.<sup>72</sup>

(c) The decision, taken in 1965, to employ B-52s against targets in South Vietnam brought SAC units into the war in a program entitled ARC LIGHT. They remained under the command of CINCSAC who, through his subordinate commanders and with assistance of PACOM, prepared the operations plans and conducted the operations. The targets attacked, however, were first selected by COMUSMACV, refined by CINCPAC, and approved for attack in Washington. In 1966, authority to execute ARC LIGHT strikes was delegated to CINCSAC and CINCPAC, with the proviso that any strike that risked a border violation would require Department of State concurrence.<sup>73</sup>

#### Developments in the Late 1960s

(U) Only minor changes in the unified command structure took place in the late 1960s. On 17 June 1967 the JCS granted CINCONAD authority to designate his five regional commands as subordinate unified commands. The rationale was that these regional commands were command and control levels through which operational control was exercised over multiservice and multipurpose weapon and environmental systems and that air defense required the coordinated contribution of more than a single service.<sup>74</sup>

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(c) Over two years later, in late 1969, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the mission, tasks, and organization of USSTRICOM/MEAFSA. They concluded that recent budget restrictions and strategic guidance had lowered the level of forces available for operations in the MEAFSA area. Accordingly, they directed USCINCSSTRIKE/USCINCMFAFSA on 18 February 1970 to modify his headquarters to provide a capability to undertake only one contingency operation in the MEAFSA area at one time (instead of two, as had previously been stipulated).<sup>75</sup>

#### Blue Ribbon Panel Consideration of the Unified Command System

(U) In July 1969, the President and the Secretary of Defense appointed a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, a group of experts from outside the Government, to study the organization and management of the Department of Defense. The Panel included the "combatant commands" in its study and found the existing structure of eight unified and specified commands "cumbersome," imposing "too broad a span of control for a single decision point in time of peace." Moreover, the Panel judged the organization of the commands "excessively layered, unwieldy and unworkable in crises, and too fragmented to provide the best potential for coordinated response to a general war situation." The Panel observed that the area commands did not receive adequate guidance for effective planning and that strategic offensive weapons were divided among several commands. Every crisis within the last decade, the Panel said, had required both ad hoc planning and organizational rearrangements.<sup>76</sup>

(U) In its report to the President on 1 July 1970 the Blue Ribbon Panel recommended a broad reorganization of the Department of Defense that included provision for a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Operations who, among other things, would be responsible for the unified commands. The duties currently delegated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as the military staff in the operational chain of command for the unified commands would be reassigned to "a senior military officer." This officer would supervise a separate staff to support military operations and serve as the channel of communication from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the unified commands. The Panel also proposed the creation of three major functional commands: (1) a strategic command, including the existing SAC and CONAD; (2) a tactical or general purpose command, incorporating all combatant general purpose forces in the United States assigned to organized combat units; (3) a logistics command. The Panel further proposed to consolidate existing area unified commands into the tactical command by merging LANTCOM and USSTRICOM, and abolishing ALCOM and USSOUTHCOM. Finally, the Panel recommended "unfragmented command authority" for the unified commanders and designation of the component commanders as deputies to the unified

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commander to make "unmistakably clear" that the combatant forces were in the chain of command that ran exclusively through the unified commander.<sup>77</sup>

#### The 1971 Unified Command Plan

(c) No action resulted on the Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations concerning the unified commands, but in the meantime, an extensive review of the commands had been undertaken within the Department of Defense. Deputy Secretary Packard initiated this review in September 1969, directing a study of the need for the US Southern Command as part of a continuing effort to reduce the US presence overseas. The resulting study, dated 1 March 1970, found a unified combatant command in Latin American incompatible with a policy of low US visibility and with "military requirements," recommending disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM and transfer of essential missions to other unified commands. The JCS, however, did not agree. They favored retention of SOUTHCOM, believing the benefits of "an area-oriented senior US military command" in Latin American outweighed the advantage of the small reduction in US military presence accomplished by the command's abolition.<sup>78</sup>

(d) After further review, Deputy Secretary Packard decided to recommend to the President the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM but, at JCS request deferred this action pending an overall review of the unified command structure. Thereupon, the JCS conducted a review, but could not reach agreement and forwarded divergent views to the Secretary of Defense on 17 November 1970.<sup>79</sup>

(e) The JCS remained united in opposing the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM. Such an action, they believed, would not be in the best interests of the United States in light of the unsettled political conditions in Latin America and the continued evidence of Soviet political and military interest in the region. The JCS also agreed that SAC and CONAD should be retained without change. On other issues, however, they could not reach a consensus. Major questions were (1) the redistribution of the USSOUTHCOM responsibilities should the President decide to abolish the command and (2) the responsibility for the MEAFSA area. The CSA and CSAF would reassign the Middle East to USEUCOM, assign Latin American and the Caribbean Islands to USSTRICOM, and redesignate LANTCOM a specified command. The CNO, however, would abolish both USSTRICOM/CINCMEAFSA and USSOUTHCOM, as well as ALCOM. The USCINCMEAFSA area would be divided as follows: southern Asia to PACOM, the Middle East to USEUCOM, and Africa south of the Sahara to LANTCOM. The USSTRICOM training and augmentation functions as well as the USSOUTHCOM area would go to LANTCOM and the ALCOM responsibilities would be divided between CONAD and PACOM.



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The CMC supported the CNO position except to propose that USSTRICOM be redesignated the US Readiness Command (USREDCOM), with unchanged responsibilities.<sup>80</sup>

(c) As ultimately resolved between Deputy Secretary Packard and the JCS, the following changes to the Unified Command Plan were recommended to the President on 5 March 1971: (1) extension of USEUCOM to include "the Mediterranean littoral, the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Iran"; (2) adjustment of the PACOM area to join with USEUCOM east of Iran and with LANTCOM west of South America and east of Africa, in such a way that LANTCOM would have responsibility for the waters surrounding South America and Africa; (3) retention of ALCOM as a unified command, but with area responsibility altered to assign PACOM the Aleutian Islands; (4) disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM and USSTRICOM/USCINCMEAFSA, with area responsibility for Africa south of the Sahara and Latin America unassigned, except for the defense of the Canal Zone, which was assigned to LANTCOM, and with contingency planning for these areas (primarily evacuation and disaster relief) retained by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (5) establishment of a new unified command, US Readiness Command (USREDCOM), without area responsibility and consisting of CONUS-based forces to reinforce other unified commands. Both SAC and CONAD would be retained without change. These revisions in the command structure, the Deputy Secretary of Defense explained to the President, adjusted area responsibilities of the major unified commands in a more logical way, improved the responsiveness of the world-wide command structure, reduced manpower and costs, and were consistent with the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel. Mr. Packard indicated, however, that the Army had reservations over the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM and the proposed arrangement for the Canal Zone.<sup>81</sup>

(d) On 21 April 1971, President Nixon approved all the proposed changes to the Unified Command Plan except for the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM. That action he deferred pending "a clarification of the political and diplomatic implications of such a move." Thereafter, Deputy Secretary Packard directed implementation of the President's decisions, and on 30 June 1971 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a new Unified Command Plan to be effective 1 January 1972, superseding the version of 20 November 1963.<sup>82</sup>

(e) Accordingly, on 31 December 1971, USSTRICOM was disestablished and replaced the following day by USREDCOM. CINCSTRIKE became USCINCRED; his headquarters remained at McDill AFB, Florida. The new command was tasked with providing a general reserve of combat-ready forces to reinforce other unified commands, conducting joint training and exercises with assigned forces, and developing recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding doctrine and "techniques for the joint employment of forces assigned." In essence USREDCOM was a redesignated USSTRICOM divested of its MEAFSA responsibilities.<sup>83</sup>

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(c) On 1 January 1972, the various adjustments in the command areas took place. USCINCEUR became responsible for the entire Mediterranean littoral, the Middle East, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, and Iran. CINCPAC assumed responsibility for the countries of southern Asia, much of the Indian Ocean, the Aleutian Islands, and parts of the Arctic Ocean, and CINCLANT's area in the Indian Ocean was reduced appropriately. In the previous Unified Command Plan, CINCLANT and CINCPAC were charged with planning for submarine, anti-submarine, and mining operations, together with the control and protection of shipping in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Now the new Plan assigned this planning mission to CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and USCINCEUR, in coordination with CINCSAC, to cover not only the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans, but the Arctic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea as well.<sup>84</sup>

(c) The President took no further action to eliminate USSOUTHCOM and it continued responsible for noraml operations, other than air defense and protection of sea communications, in Central and South America (less Mexico). The new Unified Command Plan contained only one change for USSOUTHCOM. Except for the defense of the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone, USCINCSO was to orient contingency planning primarily to evacuation and disaster relief. ALCOM, now shorn of responsibility for the Aleutian Islands, also continued without change. Six months previously, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the disestablishment of the ALCOM naval component, the Alaskan Sea Frontier, effective 30 June 1971. Thereafter responsibility for sea areas contiguous to ALCOM was given to the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier, and CINCPAC assigned a liaison officer to CINCAL's headquarters to provide necessary operational and planning information with regard to the sea approaches to Alaska.<sup>85</sup>

(c) No changes were made in the Unified Command Plan between 1 January 1972 and 1 July 1975, but a number of related developments did occur. With the signature of the Vietnam Agreement in January 1973 and the subsequent withdrawal of US combat forces from South Vietnam, the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the subordinate unified command under CINCPAC responsible for the conduct of combat operations in Vietnam, was disestablished on 29 March 1973. There now remained in PACOM four subordinate unified commands: US Forces, Korea; US Forces, Japan; US Taiwan Defense Command; and US Military Assistance Command, Thailand; and one multi-Service Headquarters, the US Support Activities Group (USSAG). The last named organization was activated in Thailand on 11 February 1973 in order to retain a capability for resumption of air and naval support to friendly forces in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The USSAG was subsequently disestablished on 30 June 1975 and the US Military Assistance Command, Thailand, on 1 October 1976. None of these subordinate organizations, however, were provided for in the Unified Command Plan.<sup>86</sup>

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(f) In the interest of streamlining a major command headquarters as well as saving nearly 900 military and civilian personnel spaces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved on 24 April 1973 the consolidation of the Headquarters, CONAD, with the headquarters of its Air Force component, the Aerospace Defense Command (ADC). Included in this action was provision for the Commander, ADC, to be raised to a four-star position with CINCONAD now serving concurrently as Commander, ADC. Simultaneously, a new Deputy CINCONAD position was established and filled by the concurrent assignment of the Commanding General, US Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM), the Army component of CONAD. This consolidation did not affect the structure of the US-Canadian North American Air Defense Command (NORAD); CINCONAD/Commander ADC continued as CINCNORAD. With Secretary of Defense and Presidential sanction, the consolidation entered into effect on 1 July 1973. Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff studied, but did not act on the consolidation of the Headquarters, ARADCOM, with the Headquarters CONAD/ADC.<sup>87</sup>

(f) On 5 October 1973, the Secretary of Defense directed a review of DOD headquarters with the goal of achieving substantial economies in manpower requirements. He specifically included the unified commands in the review and asked for the impact of 10, 20, and 30 percent reductions in the overall strengths of their headquarters. The JCS provided analyses of the impacts as requested, but warned that such reductions would result in loss of flexibility and responsiveness. They pointed out that the unified command system had been restructured on 1 January 1972 and believed that this structure provided a sound basis of organization and should not be altered. Thereafter the Secretary of Defense took no immediate action to reduce the headquarters of the unified commands.<sup>88</sup>

(f) Responding to the same Secretary of Defense directive, the Army took various actions in 1974 to reduce headquarters, notably by disestablishing the Army component headquarters in PACOM, ALCOM, and USSOUTHCOM. In USSOUTHCOM, the Army discontinued US Army Forces, Southern Command (USARSO) on 31 October 1974. The 193d Infantry Brigade (Canal Zone) assumed the Army component functions, while retaining its mission for the defense of the Canal Zone. The US Army Pacific (USARPAC) was disestablished on 31 December 1974. It was replaced by the US Army CINCPAC Support Group, a field operating agency of the Army charged with providing liaison, advice, and assistance to and coordinating with the CINCPAC Headquarters and the PACOM Service components on Army matters; assisting CINCPAC Headquarters in preparation of plans; and preparing primary Army supporting plans for all areas of PACOM except Korea and Japan. In ALCOM, the 172d Infantry Brigade (Alaska) replaced the US Army

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Alaska (USARAL) as the Army component on 1 January 1975 and Headquarters, USARAL, was disestablished.<sup>89</sup>

#### 1974-1975 Review

(c) The CSA initiated a review of the UCP in 1974. In connection with the actions to reduce Army headquarters, he also reappraised the structure of the unified and specified commands, considering current political attitudes, manpower and budget realities, and established strategic concepts for security of US interests. As a consequence, he recommended on 11 January 1974 a JCS review of the UCP and the submission of appropriate revisions to the Secretary of Defense and the President.<sup>90</sup>

(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff did study the command structure and provided their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on 19 March 1974. They favored retention of both USEUCOM and SAC without change and recommended disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM, ALCOM and CONAD. Whereas they had strenuously opposed abolition of USSOUTHCOM in 1969-1970, they had now changed their minds. In its place they proposed an austere Latin American Mutual Security Assistance Headquarters for security assistance and representational functions. With respect to planning for defense of the Canal Zone, emergency evacuation, and disaster relief, they did not agree; the CSA and CSAF wanted the mission to go to USREDCOM, while the CNO and CMC, supported by the Chairman, favored LANTCOM. To replace CONAD, the JCS proposed designation of the USAF Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) as a specified command to take over all the CONAD responsibilities, also to exercise operational command of Army air defense elements and to serve as CINCNORAD. The ALCOM air defense responsibilities would be assumed by CINCNORAD/CINCADCOM; other US forces remaining in Alaska would be administered by their respective Military Departments.

(c) With regard to LANTCOM, PACOM, and USREDCOM, as well as command arrangements for the Middle East Indian Ocean area, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree. The CNO, the CMC, and the Chairman favored retention of LANTCOM as a unified command; the CSA and CSAF proposed that it be disestablished and the Atlantic Fleet be designated a specified command responsible for the sea areas currently assigned to LANTCOM. There was a similar split over PACOM, and CSA and CSAF proposing that it be replaced by the Pacific Fleet as a specified command, with the other JCS members supporting its retention. In addition, the CSA and CSAF proposed two new mission-oriented unified commands in the western Pacific and eastern Asia as well as a Northeast Asia Command for Korea, Japan, and Okinawa

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and a Southwest Pacific Command. For USREDCOM, the CSA and CSAF would keep it as currently constituted and assign it responsibility to provide joint task forces for operations in the Caribbean and defense of the Canal Zone; the CNO and CMC, and Chairman recommended elimination of USREDCOM and replacement with a Joint Training and Exercise Headquarters, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for planning and scheduling joint training. Deployment planning in support of other unified commands would be provided for by separate JCS directive.

(C) The 1973 Middle East crisis had caused "increased awareness" of US and Free World interests in both that area and the Indian Ocean. The JCS Chairman recommended the establishment of a new mobile Joint Task Force Command for the entire area, responsible to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for security assistance, defense of the sea lines of communication (including planning therefor), emergency evacuation, and disaster relief. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, wanted no change in the existing arrangements. The CSA, CSAF and CMC did propose a definition of US military interests and objectives in the area, to be followed by a reconsideration of command structure. In the meantime, the CNO and CMC wanted an immediate change in the PACOM area to include the entire Indian Ocean, but the CSA and CSAF opposed any changes pending completion of the study of US military interests and objectives.<sup>91</sup>

(C) Over five months later, on 3 September 1974, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger announced his decision on the Unified Command Plan. He intended to recommend to the President retention of PACOM, USREDCOM, USEUCOM, and LANTCOM as unified commands and SAC as a specified command. He wanted realignment of responsibilities and missions for the unified commands to improve organizational effectiveness as well as reductions in headquarters. He did not plan to recommend any changes in existing arrangements for the Middle East and Indian Ocean at that time, but he did ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to study alternative command relations for the area. Finally, he accepted the JCS recommendations to disestablish CONAD (with ADCOM as a replacement) and to eliminate ALCOM and USSOUTHCOM. He instructed the JCS to be prepared to disestablish USSOUTHCOM as early as 30 June 1975, through the actual date would be timed to allow flexibility for the US delegation in the Panama Canal treaty negotiations.

(C) The Secretary provided specific guidance for the realignment of missions and responsibilities for the unified commands. In PACOM he wanted substantial reductions in all headquarters by means of consolidation or elimination of redundant activities. In the event


of war, the Secretary would decide whether operational control of forces assigned to PACOM would continue under CINCPAC or be transferred to regional unified commands. Contingency plans were to be prepared for activation of a Northeast Asia Command, a Southwest Pacific Command, and other regional commands and task forces as necessary. In USEUCOM, US and NATO headquarters were to be consolidated as far as possible. He also directed a 15 percent reduction in LANTCOM Headquarters and made USREDCOM responsible for contingency planning and provision of joint task force headquarters staff for the conduct of future joint operations in addition to the existing tasks of reinforcing other commands and conducting joint training. The Secretary did not intend, he added, to authorize additional assets or to assign any geographical responsibility for USREDCOM.<sup>92</sup>

(c) To incorporate these decisions, the JCS drafted a revised UCP, which the Secretary submitted to the President on 17 December 1974. All the changes, he told the President, were in the "interests of management effectiveness and the efficient use of resources" and were part of the overall effort to reduce the layering of headquarters and to streamline command relationships. On 24 February 1975, the President approved the changes as submitted by the Secretary of Defense except for the disestablishment of USSOUTHCOM. He held that action in abeyance pending receipt of plans for the allocation of residual functions.<sup>93</sup>

(c) Later, on 21 April 1975, the Secretary of Defense advised the President that USSOUTHCOM should not be disestablished pending the resolution of the Panama Canal negotiations. Once they were concluded, the Secretary intended to "move to a renamed and smaller unified command." In the interim, he planned to reduce the size and grade structure of the USSOUTHCOM Headquarters. As a result, the President took no action to eliminate USSOUTHCOM, and on 6 June 1975, the Secretary of Defense directed that the size and grade structure in the Canal Zone be reduced to the utmost.<sup>94</sup>

(d) The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a new Unified Command Plan on 27 June 1975, to enter into force on 1 July 1975. Changes in the general guidance of the Plan were primarily editorial, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff did add the statement that Service forces assigned to unified and specified commands "will be organized by the Service to support accomplishment of the unified or specified command mission."

b(1)



(c) In accord with the Secretary of Defense's decision, the new Unified Command Plan assigned USREDCOM the additional tasks of conducting planning and providing joint task force headquarters and forces for contingency operations as well as planning for disaster relief and emergency evacuation in areas not assigned to other unified commands. These areas included Africa south of the Sahara, the Malagasy Republic, Canada, Greenland, Mexico, Antarctica, Alaska, and CONUS. The new Plan continued LANTCON, USEUCOM, PACOM, and SAC without change, but deleted the responsibility of CINCLANT, CINCPAC, and USCINCEUR, in coordination with CINCSAC, to plan for submarine, anti-submarine, and mining operations and for protection of shipping throughout the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and Arctic Oceans, and the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>95</sup>

(c) The new command arrangements became effective on 1 July 1975. CONAD and its regional headquarters were disestablished on 30 June, with ADCOM activated the following day as a specified command. (The CONAD Army component, ARADCOM, had already been disestablished effective 4 January 1974.) ALCOM was disestablished on 1 July 1975 as well. USSOUTHCOM continued without change in mission, but in accordance with the Secretary of Defense's directive, its size and structure were reduced (for example, the Commander's billet was downgraded from four to three stars). In the addition, Headquarters, US Naval Forces Southern Command, and Headquarters, US Air Forces Southern Command, were disestablished on 31 December, the Navy and Air Force components of the Command becoming the US Naval Station, Panama Canal, and the USAF Southern Air Division. In a later action, on 8 October 1975, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave USCINCRD the additional responsibility for joint contingency planning, other than aerospace defense, for Alaska.<sup>96</sup>

(c) In the meantime, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had by separate actions, directed reduction in the Headquarters, USEUCOM, as well

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as planning for the activation of regional commands in the PACOM area in compliance with the Secretary of Defense's earlier guidance on improved organizational effectiveness of the commands. They had, however, deferred action on reducing LANTCOM Headquarters by 15 percent as requested by Mr. Schlesinger.<sup>97</sup> Then, on 22 October 1975, the Secretary asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review further the tasking of the unified commands to eliminate or reduce outdated tasks. He also directed the following manpower reductions in the headquarters of the commands: 20 percent in PACOM; 8 percent in LANTCOM; and 210 spaces in USEUCOM.<sup>98</sup>

#### Adjustment in the PACOM Boundary

(c) The new Unified Command Plan that became effective on 1 July 1975 made no change in the command arrangements for the Middle East and Indian Ocean area. In approving the Plan, the Secretary of Defense had asked the JCS to study alternatives for the area, but they had been unable to agree. All except the CSA favored retention of the Middle East in the USEUCOM area as currently assigned. They believed any change unwise at that time in view of the "volatility" of the Middle East situation, however, they supported the inclusion of the entire Indian Ocean in PACOM to simplify command arrangements. The CSA wanted the Middle East assigned to USREDCOM, since that command was unhampered with geographical responsibilities elsewhere; he also recommended realignment of USEUCOM to coincide with the NATO boundaries.<sup>99</sup>

(c) The Secretary of Defense had made no decision on command arrangements for the Middle East and Indian Ocean when the new Unified Command Plan was issued in June 1975. But later, on 22 October 1975, he reached a decision, selecting the position of the JCS majority. He directed adjustment in the LANTCOM/PACOM boundary to give CINCPAC responsibility for the entire Indian Ocean to the east coast of Africa, including the Gulfs of Aden and Oman and the Indian Ocean Islands (Seychelles, Mauritius, and Maldives), but excluding the Malagasy Republic. The land areas of the Middle East and North Africa remained in the USEUCOM area; Africa south of the Sahara was still unassigned. The Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared and the President approved in March 1976 an amendment to the Unified Command Plan (which became effective on 1 May 1976) to implement this area adjustment.<sup>100</sup>

#### Designation of MAC a Specified Command

(U) The most recent change in the unified and specified command structure was the designation of the Commander, Military Airlift

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Command (MAC) as a specified commander for airlift. In a program decision memorandum in July 1974, the Secretary of Defense directed the Air Force to consolidate all strategic and tactical airlift under MAC. He took this action as part of a continuing effort toward greater reliance on Service mutual reinforcement.<sup>101</sup>

(U) The Air Force, however, could see no advantage in such a move. It would, the Air Force believed, only introduce excessive headquarters layering in the approval and coordination process and could reduce the responsiveness of airlift service currently provided. Therefore the Air Force prepared in March 1975 a plan to retain MAC as the single manager for airlift service under the Secretary of the Air Force. All the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported this plan except for the Chairman. He favored the original Secretary of Defense decision, since it would further the principle of unification and increase the stature of the Commander, MAC, in his relationship with other CINCs.<sup>102</sup>

(d) The Deputy Secretary of Defense resolved the matter on 9 June 1976, reaffirming the original decision to make MAC a specified command, and directing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare the necessary change to the Unified Command Plan. They did so and the President approved this change in December 1976. Thereupon the Joint Chiefs of Staff amended the Unified Command Plan effective 1 February 1977. The Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command (CINCMAC) was named "the commander of a specified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his military airlift missions during wartime, periods of crisis, JCS exercises, and as necessary to indure the operational support to other unified and specified commands."<sup>103</sup>

# APPENDIX I

## Date of Establishment of Unified and Specified Commands Under the Unified Command Plan

CINCSAC	Strategic Air Command (SAC)	14 Dec 1946
	A specified command. President Truman's approval of the first Unified Command Plan on 14 Dec 1946 recognized the already existing SAC and brought it under JCS control. The JCS did not issue a directive to SAC until 13 Apr 1949.	
CINCAL	Alaskan Command (ALCOM)	1 Jan 1947
	Disestablished 30 Jun 1975	
CINCPAC	Pacific Command (PACOM)	1 Jan 1947
CINCFE	Far East Command (FECOM)	1 Jan 1947
	Disestablished 1 Jul 1957; functions assumed by CINCPAC.	
CINCEUR	European Command (EUCOM)	15 Mar 1947
	Nominally a unified command, but almost wholly of Army composition. Succeeded by a full-fledged unified command:	
USCINCEUR	US European Command (USEUCOM)	1 Aug 1952
CINCARIB	Caribbean Command (CARIBCOM)	1 Nov 1947
	Redesignated:	
USCINCSO	US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)	6 Jun 1963
CINCNELM	US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (NELM)	1 Nov 1947
	A specified command. From 1 Aug 1952 to 19 Feb 1960, also the Navy component of USEUCOM. Thereafter CINCNELM had the concurrent title of CINCUSNAVEUR as the Navy component of USEUCOM.	
	Disestablished 1 Dec 1963.	

CINCLANT	Atlantic Command (LANTCOM)	1 Dec 1947
CINCNE	US Northeast Command (USNEC)	1 Oct 1950
	<u>Disestablished 1 Sep 1956.</u>	
CINCUSAFE	US Air Forces, Europe (USAFE)	22 Jan 1951
	A specified command: From 1 Aug 1952 onward, also the Air Force component of USEUCOM.	
	<u>Specified command status terminated 1 Jul 1956.</u>	
CINCONAD	Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD)	1 Sep 1954
	Originally designated a joint command; made a unified command in Sep 1958. With Canada, North American Air Defense Command, NORAD, established 12 Sep 1957. CINCONAD also designated CINCNORAD.	
	<u>CONAD disestablished 30 Jun 1975, with functions assumed by ADCOM:</u>	
CINCAD	Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM)	1 Jul 1975
	<u>A specified command. NORAD continued, with CINCAD also designated CINCNORAD.</u>	
CINCSTRIKE	US Strike Command (USSTRICOM)	1 Jan 1962
	Assumed additional responsibilities, 1 Dec 1963, under added designation USCINCMEAFSA (Middle East/Southern Asia and Africa South of the Sahara).	
	<u>Disestablished 31 Dec 1971, with original functions passing to the new USREDCOM.</u>	
USCINCRED	US Readiness Command (USREDCOM)	1 Jan 1972
CINCMAC	Military Airlift Command (MAC)	1 Feb 1977
	<u>Designated a specified command for airlift</u>	

## APPENDIX II

### UNIFIED COMMAND PLANS

<u>PLAN</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SUPERSEDED BY</u>
(U) Outline Command Plan	Approved by Pres. Truman 14 December 1946	SM-180-55, 9 March 1955
(U) SM-1419-53	24 July 1953	SM-180-55, 9 March 1955
(U) SM-180-55	9 Mar 1955	SM-749-57, 24 October 1957
(U) SM-548-56	3 July 1956	SM-749-57, 24 October 1957
(C) SM-749-57	24 October 1957	SM-643-58, 8 September 1958
(C) SM-643-58	8 September 1958	SM-105-61, 4 February 1961
(C) SM-105-61	4 February 1961	SM-1400-63, 20 November 1963
(C) SM-1400-63	20 November 1963 (effective 1 December 1963)	SM-422-71, 30 June 1971
(C) SM-422-71	30 June 1971 (effective 1 January 1972)	SM-356-75, 27 June 1975
(C) SM-356-75	27 June 1975 (effective 1 July 1975)	Current

# APPENDIX III GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADCOM	Aerospace Defense Command
ALCOM	Alaskan Command
ARADCOM	Army Air Defense Command
CG AFPE	Commanding General, Army Forces, Far East
CG FEAF	Commanding General, Far East Air Forces
CG SAC	Commanding General, Strategic Air Command
CG USARPAC	Commanding General, US Army Pacific
CG USFET	Commanding General, US Forces, European Theater
CINCAD	Commander in Chief, Aerospace Defense Command
CINCAFLANT	Commander in Chief, Air Forces, Atlantic
CINCAFPAC	Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific
CINCAL	Commander in Chief, Alaska
CINCARIB	Commander in Chief, Caribbean
CINCARLANT	Commander in Chief, Army Atlantic
CINCEUR	Commander in Chief, Europe
CINCFE	Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief, Atlantic
CINCLANTFLT	Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
CINCMAC	Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command
CINCMEAFSA	Commander in Chief, Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southern Asia
CINCNAVEASTLANTMED	Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (shortened to CINCNELM in 1948)
CINCNE	Commander in Chief, Northeast
CINCNELM	Commander in Chief, US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
CINCNOBAD	Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command
CINCNOAD	Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CINCSPCOMME	Commander in Chief, Specified Command, Middle East
CINCSTRIKE	Commander in Chief, US Strike Command
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CINCUSAFE	Commander in Chief, US Air Forces in Europe

CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJTF	Commander, Joint Task Force
CMC	Commandant, US Marine Corps
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COMCARIBSEAFRON	Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier
COMNAVFE	Commander, Naval Forces, Far East
COMTAC	Commander, Tactical Air Command
COMUS JAPAN	Commander, US Forces, Japan
COMUS KOREA	Commander, US Forces, Korea
COMUSMACV	Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CONAD	Continental Air Defense Command
CONARC	Continental Army Command
CONUS	Continental United States
CSA	Chief of Staff, US Army
CSAF	Chief of Staff, US Air Force
DOD	Department of Defense
EUCOM	European Command
FECOM	Far East Command
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSPOG	Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group
JTF	Joint Task Force
LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MDAP	Mutual Defense Assistance Program
MEAFSA	Middle East, sub-Sahara Africa, and Southern Asia
MECOM	Middle East Command
MSP	Mutual Security Program
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVEASTLANTMED	US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command



## APPENDIX IV

### FOOTNOTES

1. (U) JCS 1259/7, 23 Mar 46, CCS 323.361 (2-26-45) sec 3.
2. (U) JCS 1259/27, 11 Dec 46; (U) Note by Secys on JCS 1259/27, 23 Jan 47; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 4.
3. (U) Msg, WARX 87793, JCS to CINCUSARPAC et al., 16 Dec 46, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 4.
4. (U) Msg, WARX 92711, JCS to CG USFET, 24 Feb 47, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 5.
5. (U) JCS 1259/38, 6 Aug 47, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 5.
6. (U) JCS 1259/41, 29 Sep 47, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 6. (U) Msg, WARX 89419 to CINCLANTFLT, CG CARIB, and Commander US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, 30 Oct 47, same file, sec 7.
7. (U) JCS 1259/49, 6 Nov 47; (U) Dec On JCS 1259/49, 26 Nov 47; (U) Msg, WARX 91186, JCS to CINCLANTFLT, 26 Nov 47; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 7.
8. National Security Act of 1947, PL 253, 80th Cong.
9. "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Att to JCS 1478/23, 26 Apr 48, CCS 380 (8-19-45) sec 8.
10. (U) Dec On JCS 1259/75, 30 Jun 48, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 10. (U) Msg, WAR 84987, JCS to CINCEUR, 30 Jun 48, same file, sec 11.
11. (U) JCS 1259/78, 3 Jul 48; (U) Dec On JCS 1259/78, 7 Sep 48; CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 11.
12. (U) Msg, WARX 90049, JCS to CINCNELM, 29 Sep 48 (derived from JCS 1259/95), CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 13.
13. (U) Dec On JCS 1259/110, 4 Jan 49, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 15; (U) Msg, WARX 877110, JCS to COMGEN SAC, 13 Apr 49, same file, sec 17.
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21. (U) Dec On JCS 1259/185, 27 Apr 50, CCS 381 (1-24-42) sec 21.

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